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THE DISPOSITION OF SS-LOOTED VICTIM
GOLD DURING AND AFTER
WORLD WAR II
ELIZABETH B. WHITE
When United States forces entered the Kaiseroda salt mines near
Merkers, Germany in April 1945, they discovered the vast treasure
hidden there by the Reichsbank, Germany's central bank. In one cor-
ner of the mines, separate from the Reichsbank's stocks of gold, cur-
rency, and securities, were 207 suitcases, sacks, and boxes that, when
opened, were found to contain thousands of pounds of valuable per-
sonal items, including jewelry, wedding rings, watches, eyeglass
frames, and gold teeth and dental fillings. A Reichsbank official
captured with the Merkers treasure revealed that this separate cache
represented loot that the SS had robbed from its victims at the con-
centration camps and the killing centers in Poland. News reports and
photographs of the SS loot soon electrified the international press
and provided graphic evidence of the thoroughness and ruthlessness
with which the Nazi State exploited the victims it enslaved and mur-
dered.2
* Chief Historian, Office of Special Investigations, United States Department
of Justice.
1. This article compiles the findings of the Justice Department's Office of
Special Investigations as set forth in the two reports issued by the United States
Government interagency task force on Nazi assets directed by Under Secretary of
State Stuart Eizenstat: U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. AND ALLIED EFFORTS To
RECOVER AND RESTORE GOLD AND OTHER ASSETS STOLEN OR HIDDEN BY
GERMANY DURING WORLD WAR II: PRELIMINARY STUDY (1997) [hereinafter 1ST
EIZENSTAT REPORT]; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. AND ALLIED WARTIME AND
POSTWAR RELATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH ARGENTINA. PORTUGAL, SPAIN.
SWEDEN, AND TURKEY ON LOOTED GOLD AND GERMAN EXTERNAL ASSETS AND
U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT THE FATE OF THE WARTIME USTASHA TREASURY (1998)
[hereinafter 2ND EIZENSTAT REPORT].
2. See 1ST EIZENSTAT REPORT, supra note 1. at 161.
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Over the ensuing months, through study of Reichsbank records
captured at Merkers and interrogations of officials of both the
Reichsbank and the SS, United States investigators learned that
Germany's central bank, far from being merely the passive safeguard
of SS loot, actually played a pivotal role in the last step of the Final
Solution process: the conversion of the victims' personal posses-
sions. In the spring of 1942, as the gassing facilities at Auschwitz
and at the Operation Reinhard killing centers in Lublin District were
starting to function, the SS began acquiring vast quantities of valu-
able loot. Reich Leader of the SS and Police, Heinrich Himmler,
found, however, that most of this loot was in forms that could not be
directly used to finance his dream of an industrial empire owned and
operated by the SS in which slave laborers from SS-run concentra-
tion camps would produce arms and goods for SS troops and for
planned SS settlements in the East. Himmler therefore reached an
agreement with the Reich Ministers of Economy and Finance-
Walter Funk and Lutz Schwering von Krosigk, respectively-
whereby the Reichsbank would receive SS shipments of looted gold,
silver, foreign currency, securities, jewelry and other valuable
articles, and would arrange for their disposal. The equivalent amount
would be credited in Reichsmarks to an SS account with the Ministry
of Finance.'
This arrangement with the SS did not represent the Reichsbank's
first involvement with gold taken from individual victims of Nazi
persecution and aggression. Just as the Reichsbank was the reposi-
tory for the gold that Germany looted from the central banks of the
nations it conquered, the bank also received the "monetary" gold-
gold bars and coins-that first German Jews and then the residents of
occupied countries were forced to relinquish.' In addition, the
Reichsbank also profited from gold smelted from the jewelry and
valuable personal items that were confiscated from Jews both in
3. See id. at 162-64; see also Elizabeth B. White, Majdanek: Cornerstone of
Himmier's SS Empire in the East, 7 SIMON WIESENTHAL CENTER ANNUAL 1, 3-4
(1990).
4. See 1ST EIZENSTAT REPORT, supra note 1, at 168-69. Various gold studies
conducted by the Foreign Exchange Depository Group of the Finance Division,
Office of the Military Governor, United States ("OMGUS"), U.S. National Ar-
chives and Records Administration ("NARA"), RG 260, location 390/46/8/05, Box
440.
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Germany and in the occupied territories. Such articles were turned in
to the Berlin Municipal Pawn Shop, which sent the lesser-quality
items to industrial smelters to be melted and refined. The smelters
held the fine gold extracted from the items in a special account
pending withdrawal by the Reichsbank. In the reports and records of
these smelters, this special account is generally referred to as the "J"
account, or sometimes, more explicitly, the Judengold or Jewish gold
account.5
The SS, however, preferred to conduct its business in greater se-
crecy. Under the arrangement reached with the Reichsbank, SS
Captain Bruno Melmer made regular visits in mufti to the
Reichsbank's Berlin branch, driving a truck from which he delivered
sealed packages and containers. These were then deposited in Ac-
count "M" or the "Melmer" Account. At that point, the entire con-
tents became the responsibility of the Reichsbank, which opened and
sorted the shipments, purchased all monetary gold, silver, currency,
and securities, incorporated them into its own holdings. The
Reichsbank then disposed of the remaining contents in the following
manner: small items made of precious metals, such as rings and gold
teeth, were sent to the Prussian Mint, smelted into bars, then returned
to the Reichsbank, which incorporated them into its holdings; pre-
cious stones, jewelry and larger items made of precious metals were
sent to the Berlin Pawn Shop, which arranged for the more valuable
items to be sold abroad for foreign currency and the remainder to be
sent to the Degussa6 refinery to be smelted. The Reichsbank ensured
that the SS received credit for the entire contents of its deliveries by
5. See Bundesarchiv-Zwischenarachiv Dahlwitz-Hoppegarien, Collection R 8
X (Records of the Reichsstelle fu-r Edelmetalle), folder 15, reports of gold stocks
held in inventories of various Scheideanstalten. viz.: 5 June 1941 report of the Sta-
atliche Sichsische Hfitten-und Blaufarbenwerke regarding "Judengold Fonds 'J-
(noting that 50 kg had been placed at the Reichsbank's disposal in May. reducing
the account to 18.0768 kg); see also 2ND EIZENSTAT REPORT, supra note 1, at 161
(noting that the surviving smelting records of Degussa-Deutsche Gold-und Sil-
ber-Scheideanstalt-Germany's largest smelter, also carry the notation "Jd" and.
occasionally, Judengold next to entries from the period 1939-1941).
6. Degussa-Deutsche Gold-und Silber-Scheideanstalt-was Germany's larg-
est industrial refiner and also manufactured alloys and chemicals, including hydro-
gen cyanide, the poison used in the gas chambers at Auschwltz-Blrkenau. The
Frankfurt-based company is now the world's leading manufacturer of dental al-
loys.
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paying their equivalent value in Reichsmarks to the "Max Heiliger"
account, the code name for the SS account at the Reich Ministry of
Finance.7
The 207 containers discovered in the Melmer account at Merkers
by United States forces represented the partial contents of twenty-
one SS deliveries to the Reichsbank that had not been completely
disposed of by the Reichsbank before it evacuated its holdings to
Merkers. From the captured Reichsbank records, United States mili-
tary government officials concluded that there had been seventy-
eight SS deliveries in all. Partial receipts were found for forty-three
deliveries, in which the Reichsbank informed the SS that its account
had been credited with the Reichsmark value of some of the contents
of these deliveries. Since the Reichsbank could more quickly arrive
at the value of the items it disposed of itself-gold and silver bars
and coins, currencies and securities-it paid the SS for those items
first, while payment for jewelry, dental gold, and valuable personal
items had to await their disposal by third agencies. The total amount
credited to the SS account in these partial receipts was RM
23,455,781 or $9,461,791.84.8 The gold bars and coins in these forty-
three shipments were all incorporated directly into the gold stocks of
the Reichsbank, as were the gold coins and bars in most of the other
thirty-five SS deliveries, and the bars that Degussa and the Prussian
Mint produced by smelting gold items in the shipments. Once added
to the Reichsbank's holdings, the victim-origin gold was indistin-
guishable from gold that Germany had either acquired legitimately or
had looted from occupied nations. 9
The Reichsbank's effectiveness in disposing of SS loot may have
attracted the attention of other agencies. In early 1944, the Office of
the Four Year Plan under Reich Marshall Hermann Goering reported
to the Reichsbank that its subordinate office, the Main Trusteeship
Office East-Hauptreuhandstelle Ost-which operated in the areas
7. See 1ST EIZENSTAT REPORT, supra note 1, at 162-68.
8. See INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OF EXPERTS SWITZERLAND -SECOND
WORLD WAR, SWITZERLAND AND GOLD TRANSACTIONS IN THE SECOND WORLD
WAR: INTERIM REPORT n.40 (July 1998) [hereinafter SWISS INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION]. The exchange rate used here is the same as that employed by the
Swiss Independent Commission of Experts: RM 2.479 per $1.00. See id.
9. See 1ST EIZENSTAT REPORT, supra note 1, at 162-68.
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of Poland annexed by the Reich, had been ordered to ship to the
Reichsbank all personal valuables confiscated from the non-German
inhabitants of those areas, including "significant quantities of gold
and silver items, jewelry and the like." Negotiations were also being
conducted by the Reich Ministers of Economics and Finance with
Albert Speer, the Reich Minister for Armaments and War Produc-
tion, to ship similar property confiscated in Western Europe.1"
It will probably never be possible to determine definitively the to-
tal value of the gold that the Reichsbank received from the SS. The
Reichsbank records on the Melmer account that were seized by the
United States at the end of the war have disappeared, 1 and in any
case, they apparently did not contain information about the value of
the last thirty five Melmer deliveries. Postwar studies conducted for
the United States military government to examine the proceeds from
the first forty- three Melmer deliveries show that the amount credited
to the SS for the gold coins, bars, and rings in these shipments was
RM 4,945,610.71 or $1,995,002.30. The Melmer account documents
on which these studies were based also contained other categories of
goods that included gold, such as one category with the heading
"Dental gold, broken gold, silver, etc.," another titled, "Purses, hand
bags, knives & forks, jewels, pearls, gold & diamond rings, etc.," as
well as "Watches, gold and silver coins," and "Alloy bars." The total
value of the items in these categories was RM 3,452,219.59 or
$1,392,585.55.12 The Swiss Independent Commission of Experts has
10. See id. at 168-169.
11. See 2ND EIZENSTAT REPORT, supra note 1, at 158 (noting that in 1948, the
United States Military Government in Germany transferred the captured
Reichsbank records to the Bank deutscher Lander, the predecessor of the Bundes-
bank). Although the United States did microfilm many of the Reichsbank records
prior to relinquishing them, it did not microfilm the Melmer receipts. See id. The
German Government recently reported that most of the original Reichsbank rec-
ords turned over in 1948, including the records of the Melmer account, have disap-
peared and may have been destroyed during the 1970s. See Fiona Fleck, Germany
Lost Nazi Gold Files - Official, RUETERS NEWS SERVICE, July 22, 1998.
12. Recapitulation of Proceeds: Melmer Deliveries, Melmer Summary (Partial
reckonings 1-9), Melmer Deliveries, Summary (Teilabrechnungen 1-9), NARA,
RG 260, location 390/46/9/02, Box 423, folder 940.304. In the 2nd Eizenstat Re-
port, this author estimated the total amount credited to the SS for the gold in its
loot shipments to the Reichsbank at $4,652,606.48, based upon a poorly legible,
privately held microfilm copy of the postwar report "Recapitulation of Proceeds:
Melmer Deliveries." As the analysis in the 2nd Eizenstat Report makes clear, this
1998]
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been able to confirm, on the basis of surviving microfilm of the rec-
ords of the Reichsbank Precious Metals Department, that the
Reichsbank received at least $2.9 million just in gold coins and bars
directly from Melmer. 13 That the Reichsbank in all probability re-
ceived far more than this amount in gold coins and bars from the SS
is evident from the final report on Operation Reinhard, in which SS
and Police Leader Odilo Globocnik reported that he shipped RM
9,883,658.12 or $3,986,953.66 in gold bullion and coins to the SS in
Berlin to be forwarded to the Reichsbank.14 The gold shipped by Glo-
bocnik, which was destined for the Melmer account, did not include
the gold looted by the SS from its victims at Auschwitz and at the
concentration camps and slave labor camps outside Lublin District in
Poland.
The Reichsbank used the gold it acquired from the SS deliveries in
the same way it used gold acquired from other sources. Between
1939 and 1945, the Reichsbank sold the majority of its gold holdings
primarily to Switzerland, but also to other European nations and to
some German commercial banks, and some of these sales included
gold from the Melmer account.15 For example, a postwar United
States study of the captured Reichsbank records noted that of 1,582
kilograms of gold bars sold by the Reichsbank to the Deutsche Bank
estimate derived from the assumption that the amounts credited to the SS in the
columns representing various categories of looted items were separate from the
values in the partial receipts for the first forty three Melmer deliveries. The Na-
tional Archives, however, holds underlying documentation created in preparing the
report "Recapitulation of Proceeds" that clearly demonstrates that the sums in the
categories of loot represent a break-out of the partial receipts for the first forty
three Melmer deliveries. I am grateful to Dr. Hans Safrian of the Swiss Independ-
ent Commission of Experts for drawing my attention to these documents. In any
event, as the figures discussed in the text above reflect, it is likely that the total
value of gold forwarded by the SS for delivery to the Reichsbank exceeded even
the $4.653 million figure.
13. See SWISS INDEPENDENT COMMISSION, supra note 8, at 36 n.98.
14. Although the credibility of many of Globocnik's claims in his reports to
Himmler may be questioned, he does state that this amount of gold was "handed
over on receipt to the SS Economic and Administrative Main Office." It seems un-
likely that he would inflate a figure for which he could be held accountable. See
Nuremberg Documents NO-059 and NO-062, Trials of War Criminals Before the
Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, (Nuremberg,
1946-1949), 5:725-731.
15. See 1ST EIZENSTAT REPORT, supra note 1, at 170.
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during the war, 673 kilograms-more than forty percent-came from
the Melmer account. Other postwar United States studies show that
the Reichsbank also sold Melmer gold to the Dresdner Bank. "
One purpose of these gold sales was to acquire the foreign cur-
rency necessary to finance Germany's war effort. In Turkey, for ex-
ample, where a free gold market flourished during the war, the Deut-
sche Bank and Dresdner Bank sold gold acquired from the
Reichsbank at a highly advantageous rate. The two commercial
banks then used the Turkish currency thus acquired to buy Swiss
francs and other valuable foreign currency from German and other
Axis officials based in Turkey. Since the banks offered these offi-
cials an exchange rate that was far better than the official rate, this
arrangement helped the German and Axis governments to finance
their operations in Turkey while supplying the banks with the foreign
currency necessary to buy more gold from the Reichsbank. "
Any gold bars and coins that the Reichsbank acquired from the SS
deliveries but did not sell almost certainly came into the custody of
the United States at the end of the war, since United States forces
seized more than ninety-eight percent of the Reichsbank's holdings
in Germany. The United States Government officials responsible for
safeguarding and disposing of the Reichsbank treasure quickly
learned of the Reichsbank's role in receiving and liquidating SS loot.
They were therefore aware that not only the seized contents of the
Melmer account, but also the holdings of the Reichsbank itself con-
tained assets looted from the victims of Nazi persecution, including
gold smelted from their personal belongings and dental fillings." In-
deed, in a July 1946 report to the United States Secretary of State on
the proposed distribution of the Reichsbank treasure, Livingston T.
Merchant, the Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs at the
United States Embassy in Paris, noted that of the 8,307 gold bars
16. See 2ND EIZENSTAT REPORT, supra note 1. at 159.
17. See 2ND EIZENSTAT REPORT, supra note 1. at 129-30 (noting. in addition.
that according to Allied intelligence reports, the legations of certain neutral na-
tions, specifically Spain, Switzerland, and Portugal, were also occasionally per-
mitted to participate in this currency exchange).
18. See ISTEIZENSTATREPORT, supra note 1, at 166, 169-171: see also Col. B.
Bernstein, Director, Finance Division, U.S. Group Control Council (Germany),
Report on Recovery of Reichsbank Precious Afetals (6 September 1945), NARA,
RG 260, OMGUS Property Division, location 390144133/05, Box 650.
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seized with the Reichsbank holdings at Merkers that they "may, after
proper assay and expert consideration, be determined to represent
melted down gold teeth fillings." No attempt to assay the gold was
ever made, however. Nor, apparently, was any attempt made to use
the seized Reichsbank records to identify gold bars in United States
custody that originated from the Melmer account, despite the fact
that the Reichsbank official responsible for keeping those records
maintained that they could be used to trace all the gold bars in the
Reichsbank's reserves to their original accounts or deposits. 9
At the Paris Reparations Conference held in late 1945, the repre-
sentatives of 18 Allied nations devised an agreement for extracting
reparations from Germany. The conferees decided that monetary
gold captured in Germany, since it amounted to far less than all the
gold looted from the German-occupied nations and was, moreover,
mostly unidentifiable as to origin, should be pooled and distributed
to the claimant countries according to their losses. As with other
forms of reparations, the gold in this "gold pool" was to be distrib-
uted only to national governments, which were responsible for ad-
dressing the needs of their individual citizens. °
The war, however, had produced a class of persons who could not
be provided for by the traditional reparations arrangements because
they had no national government to protect their interests: the class
designated as "non-repatriable victims of German action."'" Search-
ing for a way to provide financial assistance to this class, the United
States seized upon the idea of using the notorious SS cache from the
Melmer account and any other such captured caches of victim-origin
gold. As the result of a United States proposal, the Paris Reparation
Agreement established a fund to assist non-repatriable victims of
Nazi action that was to be financed as follows: $25 million to be ob-
tained from the liquidation of German assets in neutral nations; the
proceeds from heirless assets in neutral countries of victims of Ger-
man action; plus "all the non-monetary gold found.., in Ger-
19. See 1ST EIZENSTAT REPORT, supra note 1, at 170-71.
20. See id. at 54-62.
21. See id. at 59-62 (quoting Article 8 of Part I of the Paris Peparation Agree-
ment at pages 60-62).
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many."2 2 As with the other reparations established by the Paris
Agreement, this fund was not to be used to satisfy the claims of indi-
viduals but was to be turned over to the Inter-Governmental Com-
mittee on Refugees (later the International Refugee Organization),
which would apply it to resettling and rehabilitating non-repatriable
victims of Nazi persecution. This arrangement preserved the right of
individual victims to press claims against Germany in the future.!
When the United States military government in Germany prepared
to distribute the gold in its custody, it discovered that the Paris Repa-
ration Agreement had a significant flaw: it did not provide defini-
tions for the "monetary gold" to be placed in the gold pool, or for the
"non-monetary gold" designated for the non-repatriable persecutees.
The only available definition of "monetary gold" was the statement
of the United States representative to the Paris Reparations Confer-
ence that monetary gold consisted of "gold bullion and gold coins
found in Germany," or "gold which is in such form as to be a me-
dium of exchange."24 On the other hand, the United States wanted to
define the term "non-monetary gold found in Germany" as broadly
as possible and therefore expanded it to include both gold and non-
gold personal property found in Austria, as well as in Germany, that
represented loot seized from political, racial, or religious victims of
Nazi Germany or its satellites.
These two definitions conflicted, however. If, as implied by the
United States definition of non-monetary gold, the origin of gold as
the personal property of Nazi victims was to be the deciding factor in
determining its disposal, then non-monetary gold should include not
only gold bars and coins found in the Melmer account and other
caches of concentration camp loot, but also the gold bars in the cap-
tured Reichsbank gold reserves that had been produced from victims'
possessions. If, on the other hand, the current form of the gold was to
determine its disposition, then not only would an attempt to identify
victim-origin gold in the captured Reichsbank treasure become un-
necessary, but gold coins and bars found in clearly identifiable
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See Frank C. Grabell, Disposition of Valuables, Jan. 28, 1947, Foreign Ex-
change Depository, in NARA, RG 260. location 30/46/10102. Box 469, file
11/427/11.
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caches of victim-origin SS loot would qualify as monetary gold to be
added to the gold pool. In 1947, the United States Government chose
the simplest course by defining monetary gold as gold bars and
coins, whatever their origin. Consequently, the United States con-
tributed to the gold pool all the Reichsbank's stocks of gold coins
and bullion, including those that originated from the Melmer Ac-
count, as well as at least 6,427 gold coins and 10.7 kilograms of gold
bars that the United States military government had identified as
constituting loot robbed by the SS from its victims at the killing
25centers and concentration camps.
The organization entrusted with distributing the gold placed in the
gold pool by the Western Allies was the Tripartite Gold Commission
("TGC"). Since the gold pool was far too small to compensate the
claimant nations for all the gold that Germany had looted from them,
the TGC limited claims to gold that had been held by a central bank
or as part of a nation's monetary reserve. 26 During the intervening
decades, the misperception has arisen that the TGC's narrow defini-
tion of monetary gold also applied to the gold that was contributed to
the gold pool. This has given rise to contentions that gold surren-
dered by the citizens of occupied countries under currency laws that
were also in force in Germany constituted "victim gold" that should
have been excluded from the gold pool. There is, however, no evi-
dence that the signatories of the Paris Reparation Agreement, whose
foremost concern was to obtain as much as possible for their national
treasuries so that they might rebuild their economies, ever intended
such restrictions when they designated that "all the monetary gold
found in Germany" should be put in the gold pool.
It may, however, be fairly debated whether the signatories of the
Paris Agreement intended the gold pool to contain bars composed of
the wedding rings and dental fillings of the murdered victims of the
SS. The United States Government's 1947 decision to use the most
expedient definition of monetary gold in distributing the gold in its
custody was the result not of callousness toward refugees' needs so
much as of the urgent need to put all resources to work as quickly as
25. See 1STEIZENSTAT REPORT, supra note 1, at 171-180.
26. See Emrys Davies, The Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of
Monetary Cold, Address before the London Conference on Nazi Gold (Dec. 2-4,
1997) (on file with the author).
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possible to rebuild war-ravaged Europe. The United States Govern-
ment did spend vast sums of money caring for, housing, and reset-
tling victims of Nazi persecution. Five decades later, with European
economies rebuilt, but the needs of Holocaust survivors still urgent,
we can afford to revisit this issue and to judge it by different stan-
dards than those of 1947.
As a result of the finding in the May 1997 United States Govern-
ment study of Nazi assets that gold taken from concentration camp
and death camp victims was incorporated into the gold pool, the
United States, Britain, and France proposed that the 5.5 tons of un-
distributed gold remaining in the TGC gold pool be used to assist the
survivors of Nazi persecution. This proposal has led to the creation
of the Nazi Persecutee Relief Fund, which will be used primarily to
aid the "double victims" in Eastern Europe who have received little
or nothing in compensation for their suffering and losses during
World War II. Some countries that are not claimants to the TGC gold
pool have also made commitments to contribute to this fund. 1
By uncovering evidence that gold taken from persecutees was
used to finance Germany's war effort and to rebuild the postwar
economies of Western Europe, the May 1997 Eizenstat report finally
demonstrated conclusively what had long been suspected but never
proved. Many questions remain, however. Although it will never be
possible to quantify definitively the amount of victim-origin gold
that was incorporated into Germany's monetary reserves, it should be
remembered that the Melmer account probably represented only a
small portion of the valuables that were robbed from persecutees,
since the victims of the killing centers and concentration camps had
already been relieved of most of their personal possessions by the
Nazi state before their arrival at the camps. Further research is
needed to determine what happened to the gold robbed from victims
who never entered the SS camp system, for example, the hundreds of
thousands who were murdered in the occupied areas of the Soviet
Union. Just as the Melmer account was not the only source of victim-
origin gold incorporated into the Reichsbank's reserves, the
Reichsbank was but one of many German agencies that received and
exploited the gold and other personal property looted from the vic-
27. See 2ND EIZENSTAT REPORT, supra note 1. at xxi.
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tims of Nazi persecution. There is, for example, still much to learn
about the efforts of the Office of the Four Year Plan and the German
Foreign Office to sell apparently large amounts of victim jewelry
abroad, particularly in Switzerland.28 Further research into these
questions will add to our understanding not only of the significance
to Germany's war economy of gold and other valuables looted from
persecutees, but also of the extent to which the systematic plundering
of the victims of the Nazi state was carried out by ostensibly more
respectable German government and financial institutions.
28. See 2ND EIZENSTAT REPORT, supra note 1, at 168 (noting that captured
German records reveal that the German Foreign Office regularly sent packages of
Judenschmuck (Jewish jewelry) to its legation in Bern to be delivered to an agent
who exchanged them for critically needed industrial diamonds).
[14:213224
